A big power is emerging to our west. Shackled by sanctions for decades, and threatened incessantly with war, Iran had been walled away from the rest of the world since 1979. But now that America has demonstrated its impotence by failing every military objective it had laid in the war since February, the country that was tied down behind a wall of sanctions is emerging as a big power in the region.

In that sense, what is happening with Iran today is similar to what happened with China following détente. That country, too, was tied down and shackled and shunned by the global community ever since its revolution in 1949. Détente was its negotiated re-entry into the community of nations, and since then, the reforms undertaken within China propelled it to becoming a global power.

Iran’s story differs from this in the sense that it is not going to be a global power. However, it is certainly going to emerge as a regional power in a very important region of the world. Second, Iran’s re-entry into the world community is going to be far more disorderly than that of China, mainly because it has had to fight its way out of the oblivion into which it was banished since the revolution of 1979.

Short of an attempt to destroy its infrastructure, Iran’s emergence as a big power in the region is unstoppable.

But emergence is now underway. It will be a very disorderly, and possibly violent, affair. A lot depends on which faction within Iran manages to rise to the top and take over decision-making. In China, an internal reckoning took place within the Communist Party first, before the reform-minded elements around Deng Xiaoping could rise to the top and take control of the post-opening up trajectory. That is a fraught history, from the Cultural Revolution and the purge of Deng in 1966, to the attempted coup by Lin Biao and his death in a plane crash in Mongolia in 1971, to the rise of Zhou Enlai and the so-called Gang of Four that was ranged against him and the eventual emergence of Deng as the successor, his second purge after Zhou Enlai’s death, and eventual restoration following Mao’s death in 1976.

That is when China firmly embarked on its reformist course and broke its moorings to Mao’s thought. What followed was a carefully calibrated set of measures designed to open the Chinese economy up to the outside world — slowly and experimentally. That trajectory eventually propelled China towards becoming a global power, even if the process took many decades to complete.

Iran is now at a similar point in its trajectory. Following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and its victory in the war against the Zionist alliance of America and Israel, it now has to go through the internal process of wrangling between rival factions, who must decide whether to remain wedded to the past or break out into a new future. This process will take years to unfold; what makes the Iranian trajectory different from the Chinese one is that in Iran the process will unfold in the context of a war.

It is evident that within Iran there is a pragmatic faction that wants to see the war come to a close and the task of rebuilding the country to begin. But equally important, there is a faction that wants to press ahead with the fighting to deliver a humiliating defeat to the aggressors. This faction wants to do to the Americans in the Middle East what the Taliban, too, did to them in Afghanistan: force a hurried and disorderly flight from the region.

The real game begins after that. Once the Americans leave the region, the Iranian military machine will turn its attention towards the Gulf monarchs. There will be reparations to pay. The bill for the war has already been served. In July 2025, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told the Financial Times that there could be no return to nuclear talks until Iran had been compensated for the damage caused by the June war. America scoffed at the demand. In March 2026, the demand was made again in the counter-offer that Iran made to the American proposal for talks. In April, they added an amount — $270 billion — while another figure of $300bn was written into the US-Iran MOU in June 2026.

Nobody should be scoffing at the demand now. In addition to retaining control of Hormuz, Iran will press this demand in the days to come and it is the Gulf monarchs who will be left to pay the bill once the US decides the conflict no longer serves any of its interests. And once the Gulf monarchs settle this amount, another will surface. And then another.

Iran’s emergence as a big power in the region is now unstoppable, short of an attempted catastrophic destruction of the entire country’s infrastructure by the Zionist alliance. This may be an unlikely outcome at this point in time, but it cannot be ruled out. The emergence as a big power is already underway. After consolidating their control on Hormuz, they will next turn their gaze to the riches of the Gulf monarchs. Those riches are now imperilled.

China’s story is instructive here because it tells us that a post-revolutionary polity can manage its affairs to secure its re-entry into the global system of trade, finance and diplomacy to procure maximum benefits for itself. Whether Iran manages this moment similarly, or whether they decide to press their military advantage to the hilt and use their newfound centrality to avenge the past rather than build a future, is the big question hanging over all of us today.

The writer is a business and economy journalist.

khurram.husain@gmail.com

X: @khurramhusain

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

Why new provinces? The interior minister, who announced the plan, hasn’t held forth on the reasoning or offered an acceptable justification for adopting such an extreme and hazardous course. However, he has mentioned bad governance, population implosion, and systemic failures as some of the causes. Nor are there any official authoritative studies proposing a close nexus between good governance and smaller administrative structures. In fact, the global landscape reveals a mixed pattern. Some countries have fewer or territorially larger constituent units, and yet they are stable, functional, even enviable. Others have multiple small units/ provinces, but are perennially afflicted with broken, inept and even failed political systems.

The factors that generally determine the performance and vitality of a state are the legitimacy and efficacy of its political system, the character and ability of its leadership, and the maturity and capacity of its institutions — not only to deliver better governance, but also to meet the continuing challenges thrown up by ever-changing societal and state imperatives. In revitalising the ‘failed’ political systems, we don’t know if the so-called plan contemplates these factors.

Who is demanding them? Interestingly, most of these ideas have originated outside regular political processes, whether as One Unit, Basic Democracy, ‘Islamisation’, enlightened moderation, or hybrid governance. People have always been on the receiving end of new-fangled ideas and their pernicious consequences. The call for a structural ‘reset’, too, appears to have similar origins. So far, none of the governments — federal, provincial or even local — or the mainstream political leaderships have called for restructuring the provinces. However, there is near-consensus across the political spectrum on creating provinces in south Punjab, and KP’s Hazara belt. In fact, the Punjab and KP assemblies passed resolutions for these provinces, but they went nowhere.

Instead of new units, the country needs softer options to heal societal wounds.

Reorganising the state structures would be an extremely risky exercise. India’s Congress party had included the ‘linguistic’ provinces in its manifesto as early as 1917. Yet, after Partition, both prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and home minister Vallabhbhai Patel were reluctant to reorganise the states, fearing balkanisation of the fledgling country. It was many months of intense political agitations across the country, expert studies, judicial commissions, and a much-mourned fast unto death by Telugu nationalist Potti Sriramulu that finally brought the government around. Still, the Reorganisation Act of 1955 was not passed to improve governance but to group various linguistic communities in their own separate states. In other words, distinctive ethno-cultural identities were recognised and restored, rather than brutally denied and suppressed as would have been the case if the states had been broken up in a manner that dispersed the historically located ethno-cultural communities — something that is being contemplated here.

Is referendum feasible? Perhaps encouraged by the smooth passage of the controversial 26th and 27th constitutional amendments, and not expecting a large section of the political establishment to oppose the proposed move, some elements here had appeared confident of securing the required numbers to ensure restructuring. However, the JUI-F, ANP, PTI, and even the ruling party’s major coalition partner have dug in their heels. In fact, even the prime minister and his party seem reluctant to support the restructuring, though some government ministers are backing it, albeit without the cabinet’s approval. Likewise, the Sindh Assembly has also rejected the break-up of the province.

As a result, other means are being sought — preferably, a referendum to execute the plan. But a referendum would not validate the wholesale reorganisation of the state. It lacks legitimacy and credibility. It cannot be used to circumvent or be a substitute for the mandatory constitutional amendment. People will not accept it because every military dictator has used it to legitimise their rule. Instead, a referendum will be seen as farcical and incite public anger, triggering a maelstrom of pushback.

Will the ‘plan’ succeed? Any idea, policy, or law that is imposed on the people has miserably failed to achieve its objectives; in fact, it has often led to disasters. Steamrolling the restructuring of provinces — against the will of the people — will further aggravate identity-driven politics across a fragile multiethnic landscape. It may even ignite the tinderbox the country has become, particularly for poor and disgruntled youth who have endured the harrowing realities of failed systems. The numbers are dreadful. Half the population lives in poverty, around 28 million children are out of school, four out of 10 children suffer from stunted growth, three-fourths of the populace is consuming contaminated water, and the increasingly murky security environment scares away local and foreign investors.

In these dire circumstances, the country desperately needs softer options to heal societal wounds — options that recompense the people through justice, equity, peace, opportunity, and development, which are democracy’s tested tools. The yawning fault lines — ethnic, social, political, inter-provincial and centre-province — must be mended, and federal democracy, which remains buried under the hybrid regime, restored.

The system does need a ‘reset’. But the reset should mean building efficient and accountable institutions, strengthening rules-based governance, and allowing legitimate and representative leadership to run political and public offices. That requires a continuous process of fair, free elections held on time, so that dead wood can be replaced with a fresher, cleaner leadership at the federal, provincial, and local levels.

Finally, a ‘reset’ would be fatal if it ignored the emotional, even spiritual, bonding of the various ethno-cultural communities with their respective provinces. This bonding goes beyond ideology or politics. It is the product of the centuries-long interplay between these communities and their distinctive land, history, culture, language, literature and art. This bonding leads many in Sindh to conceive their province as an indivisible historical entity — a firmer federalised version of Scotland or Quebec.

The writer is a lawyer.

shahabusto@hotmail.com

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

The Islamabad-based watchdog welcomed the signing of memoranda of understanding and agreements be­­tween Google and the governm­e­­nt after the company opened its of­­fice in Pakistan to advance the country’s digital vision, but expres­sed ap­­prehensions that the tech company and the government had not made details of their agreements public.

“A big question is what exactly has been agreed? Will the government or Google publish all MoUs, agreements, contracts or other arra­ngements signed between them? If some provisions must remain confidential, who decided that and under what law?” Freedom Network asked in its alert shared with the media through a press release.

The media watchdog asked if there were any undisclosed commitments concerning access to user data, content, metadata or government databases. “Under what circumstances can Pakistani authorities request information about Google users? Will every request require a valid legal process and judicial oversight? Will Google reject requests that are overly broad, vague or inconsistent with fundamental rights?”

Media watchdog seeks details of MoUs, agreements

Freedom Network was explicit in asking if any protection or unambiguous safeguards against government access to journalists’ Gmail, Google Drive, photos, YouTube accounts, search-related information or other data that could reveal confidential sources were part of the agreements and MoUs.

The watchdog asked Google to commit itself to not removing any content merely because a government agency asks, or that requests for blocking or removal shall be assessed under transparent legal standards and users shall receive notice and an opportunity to challenge decisions where legally possible.

Freedom Network also worried about where Pakistani citizens’ data would be stored as the country is developing a national data-governance framework that urges data sovereignty, minimum disclosure and citizens’ right to know who has accessed their information. “Will Pakistani users’ data be stored in Pakistan, overseas, or both?” it asked Google.

“There should not be informal or undocumented data-sharing arrangements between Google and the Pakistan government.”

The press release quoted the media watchdog as asking the tech company: “Who independently will audit Google’s compliance with privacy and human-rights safeguards in Pakistan? The answer should not be simply the government.”

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

ISLAMABAD: Even as members of the public who have signed up for the PM’s Fuel Relief Scheme queued up at fuel pumps late on Wednesday night, petroleum dealers were still not clear about the mechanism whereby they would be compensated.

The concern was voiced by the Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association (PPDA) during a presser in Karachi, where its chairman Malik Khuda Bakhsh said that no fuel pump could afford to bear a loss of Rs100 per litre without clarity on how they will be compensated.

He claimed that between the petroleum ministry, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (Ogra) and even the finance ministry, no one had been able to answer their questions.

“Officials from Ogra and oil marketing companies say that the petroleum ministry will possibly pay the subsidy amount, whereas ministry officials maintain that payments will be made by the finance ministry, while finance ministry officials assure us that the State Bank will release the funds in a day or two,“ Mr Bakhsh added.

A day earlier, the National Steering Com­mittee on Fuel Subsidy — chaired by Deputy PM Ishaq Dar — had ordered that payments to fuel stations under the PM’s scheme be processed within 24 hours through the State Bank of Pakistan.

However, Mr Bakhsh said the federal government had assured dealers that they would be taken into confidence before the launch of the fuel relief package, but lamented that no such consultation took place.

”The government has to understand that if payments are not reimbursed in time, many dealers will stop participating in [the scheme], as many previous promises were also not fulfilled by the government,” he added.

PPDA Vice Chairman Tariq Hassan said that around 14,000 dealers across the country have been trying desperately to contact the government over the past three days, adding that whenever Islamabad wants to enforce something, it stops communication.

Another vice chairman, Anwar Kamal, said that if the scheme was to be successful, the government must negotiate with dealers, adding that dealers could not afford to have billions tied up for a long period under this scheme.

Mr Bakhsh later told Dawn they had been invited to a virtual meeting with the relevant federal secretary on Thursday morning.

He added that Ogra officials had also reached out to brief him, but he had asked for that information in writing, so he could relay that to the members of his association.

Facilitation desks

Earlier, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif ordered authorities to set up facilitation desks comprising administration officials, volunteers and petrol pump staff to assist citizens in easily obtaining fuel subsidy under the special relief scheme, which was rolled out across the country at Wednesday midnight, following the launch of the pilot phase in Islamabad.

Presiding over a meeting to review progress on the scheme, PM Shehbaz directed that personnel deployed at the facilitation desks should guide eligible citizens and provide them with all possible assistance in registration and other necessary procedures.

The prime minister also asked the relevant authorities to remain proactive in creating public awareness about the scheme, which will benefit people from all four provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

The meeting was informed that the scheme had been designed in a simple and easy-to-understand manner for the public. Only four pieces of information were required for registration: the applicant’s CNIC number, vehicle number plate, province of registration and vehicle registration date.

Complete details of the fuel subsidy scheme are available in Urdu on www.pmfuelrelief.pk.

According to an official, the number of successful registrations was gradually rising, while provincial governments were extending “full cooperation” for nationwide implementation of the scheme.

Oil prices

Meanwhile, notifying fresh POL rates on Wednesday night, Ogra attributed the steep hikes to elevated international crude oil and petroleum product prices.

The price of high-speed diesel was increased by Rs5.62 per litre to Rs421.45, while petrol became costlier by Rs6.88 per litre, taking its new price to Rs391.22 per litre.

However, Reuters reported on Wednesday night that oil prices fell in the open market on reports that Saudi Arabia was offering additional crude cargoes through Oman eased some concerns about Middle East supply disruptions.

Brent crude futures fell $2.92, or 2.7 per cent, to settle at $105.83 a barrel. US West Texas Intermediate futures fell $3.40, or 3.2pc, to close at $102.43, Reuters reported.

Saudi Arabia is offering more loadings of crude oil to Asian refiners via ship-to-ship transfers off Oman’s Sohar port, people familiar with the matter said, blunting some of the hit to global supply from attacks on the country’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea.

Oil prices had gained more than $3 in the previous session after shipping industry sources said crude loadings at Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export hub of Yanbu had been suspended and Riyadh had cancelled some cargo deliveries to European customers.

The suspension followed strikes on the East-West pipeline, which feeds the Saudi port of Yanbu. It became the main Saudi outlet for oil exports after Iran began blockading the Strait of Hormuz after US and Israeli attacks on the country.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

“The inaugural meeting of the Commission was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad,” the Foreign Office said in a statement.

The meeting was co-led by Li Ya, deputy director general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bilal Mahmood Chaudhary, director general for China at Pakistan’s Foreign Office.

The FO described the ope­r­ationalisation of the Pakis­tan-China Boundary Joint Com­m­ission as a “significant milestone for Pak­istan-China relations”, saying it would set “the stage for enh­anced cooperation in border management, joint border surveys, trade flows and people to people connectivity.”

The commission has its origins in the 2013 Agre­ement on the Boundary Mana­gement System signed during the visit of then Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Islamabad. Article 45 of the agreement provides for establishment of the joint commission to oversee implementation of the border management arrangements.

The mechanism would provide an institutional framework for dealing with practical issues along the border, including maintenance and inspection of the boundary, joint surveys, boundary marker issues, management of cross-border facilities and handling of incidents involving the border.

Its activation also gives the two countries a mechanism for regular coordination on a border that is important for movement between Pakistan and China, including thr­ough the Khunjerab crossing, and for trade and connectivity linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The new commission is distinct from the Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission that was established under the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963. The earlier commission had a specific and essentially one time mandate to conduct surveys, establish boundary markers, prepare detailed maps and set out the alignment of the boundary.

Its work ended after the signing of the protocol and maps completing the demarcation process. The 1963 agreement was signed in Beijing by then-Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Chinese counterpart Chen Yi.

It also provided that, following a settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the relevant sovereign authority would reopen negotiations with China on the boundary.

The 2013 agreement, by contrast, established a continuing system for managing the already demarcated boundary, including provisions for dealing with boundary markers and cross-border infrastructure. The agreement says that if a marker cannot be restored at its original location, the joint commission can determine another suitable location, provided the boundary line itself is not altered.

India, which disputes the validity of the 1963 agreement and regards the territory covered by it as part of Occupied Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, rejected the new mechanism.

“We have seen reports in this regard. Our position on this matter is clear and consistent. There is no boundary between Pakistan and China. We reject the so-called Joint Commission, which is without any legal basis,” Ind­ian Foreign Ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said.

For Pakistan and China, however, the commission provides a new institutional arrangement for managing their border relationship and dealing with practical issues that have emerged since the 2013 agreement, while leaving the broader territorial positions of the parties unchanged.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026